Taxation and technology adoption: a hotelling approach by Kriechel, B. & Ziesemer, T.H.W.
  
 
Taxation and technology adoption: a hotelling
approach
Citation for published version (APA):
Kriechel, B., & Ziesemer, T. H. W. (2006). Taxation and technology adoption: a hotelling approach. (UNU-
MERIT Working Paper Series; No. 009). Maastricht: UNU-MERIT, Maastricht Economic and Social
Research and Training Centre on Innovation and Technology.
Document status and date:
Published: 01/01/2006
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.
• The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page
numbers.
Link to publication
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 04 Dec. 2019
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Working Paper Series  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
#2006-009 
 
Taxation and Technology Adoption:  
A Hotelling Approach 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ben Kriechel and Thomas Ziesemer 
 
February 2006 
 
United Nations University - Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology 
 Keizer Karelplein 19,  6211 TC Maastricht, The Netherlands 
Tel: (31) (43) 350 6300, Fax: (31) (43) 350 6399, e-mail: info@merit.unu.edu, URL: http://www.merit.unu.edu 
 
  
 
 
 
Taxation and Technology Adoption:  
A Hotelling Approach 
 
Ben Kriechel and Thomas Ziesemer1
 
 
Abstract 
Environmental regulation and competitiveness are issues that seem to be at odds. However, the 
`Porter Hypothesis' states that firms can actually gain in competitiveness if they are subject to 
stricter environmental regulation. We show in a simple model the basic setting of the problem to 
apply it then to a Hotelling framework. A non-adoption tax (adoption subsidy) is shown to 
destroy a non-adoption equilibrium in a closed economy model. We show that taxes not directly 
targeting the non-adoption problem may fail to have an adoption incentive on the firms. In an 
open economy model the Porter Hypothesis is shown to hold if (i) non-adoption taxes are higher 
than adoption costs for one country and lower for the other, and (ii) the returns of second 
adoption are insufficient to cover the net adoption costs. 
 
Keywords: Environmental Policy, Technology Adoption, Porter Hypothesis 
JEL codes: Q2, F1, H7, O3 
 
 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers 
ISSN 1871-9872 
 
Maastricht Economic and social Research and training centre on Innovation and Technology, 
UNU-MERIT 
 
UNU-MERIT Working Papers intend to disseminate preliminary results of the research 
carried out at the institute to attract comments 
 
                                                     
1 Ben Kriechel is at ROA, University of Maastricht, and IZA, Thomas Ziesemer at the Department of 
Economics, University of Maastricht, and UNU-MERIT. For contact: T.Ziesemer@algec.unimaas.nl. 
 
 

  
The environmental Porter Hypothesis suggests (see Porter and van der Linde, 1995)
that the costs of compliance with environmental standards may be partially or even
fully offset by innovations they trigger and this may even lead to absolute advantages
over foreign competitors. While the general fear of trade economist was rather one of
ecological dumping rather than increased environmental regulation to improve competi-
tiveness, the article was greeted with skepticism. Nevertheless, it led economists to think
seriously about the gist of the Porter Hypothesis: Is it possible that firms could gain
advantage over their foreign rivals through tougher environmental regulation? While
classical trade theory offers no reason to believe in the Porter Hypothesis, imperfect
competition models were considered promising to find some theoretical foundations to
the case study and anecdotal evidence offered by Porter and van der Linde.
Empirical support for the Hypothesis is based on case study evidence (see Ayres
(1994) Porter and van der Linde (1995a)). Palmer, Oates and Portney (1995) provide
empirical arguments explaining why full offsets are rather unlikely. They base their
argument on information provided by entrepreneurs. A problem with both of these
types of information provision is that the costs of innovation precede the returns and
the returns are often stretched out over decades. Jaffe and Palmer (1997) critically
evaluate the Porter Hypothesis, they attempt to empirically ‘test’ the Hypothesis, but
find no evidence supporting it. This empirical evaluation is based on the link between
the stringency of environmental regulation and R&D, but not on adoption.
There have been several attempts to construct trade models based on the gist of the
Porter Hypothesis. Ulph (1996a) constructs a Brander-Spencer type of strategic trade
model with Cournot competition. Firms can invest in technology affecting variable costs
but not the accompanying pollution. He shows that the strategic interaction between
producers reduces the government’s incentive to loosen environmental regulation. He
concludes, though, that the reduction of pollution with the lowering of the variable costs
could change that result. This is the avenue that Simpson and Bradford III (1996)
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pick up. They model the firms in a similar fashion, with the exception that R&D not
only lowers marginal costs, but also the emission of the pollutant. The government
uses eﬄuent taxation to maximize the domestics firm’s profits net of the environmental
externalities of production. The government is able to force the firm into a Stackelberg-
leader position relative to its foreign competitor. For some special cases of specifications
and numerical parameter values they are able to construct a strengthening of regulation
resulting in a shift of profits from foreign to domestic firms. However, they stress that
this is not a general result and it is unlikely, that environmental regulation should be
used as a policy device to induce industrial advantage.
Greaker (2003) models the Porter Hypothesis by assuming that due to the abatement
technology the environment is an ‘inferior input’ in the production process. For some
ranges of environmental taxation, this is shown to increase competitiveness. However,
the impact on profits remains ambiguous.
Feess and Taistra (2001) model a two-period game with Cournot competition. The
environmentally friendly technology is assumed to lead to a decrease of unit costs in the
second period, however not in a way that reduces overall costs. Policy agencies of the
foreign nation are assumed to stochastically imitate the national environmental regula-
tion. As the overall costs are always higher with environmental friendly production, the
strong form of the Porter Hypothesis is not reached.
Bertrand-type imperfect competition models were introduced in the context of strate-
gic environmental trade policy in the paper by Barrett (1994). In the context of cost
saving research Ulph (1996b) shows both for environmental taxation and for environ-
mental standards that firms can benefit from tighter regulation if only the governments
act strategically, but firms do not.
Principal-agent models of the Porter Hypothesis are set in the context of organizational
inefficiencies. In this model type incentives between principal and agent over the choice of
projects are miss-aligned. Environmental regulation helps to re-align the preferences of
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principal and agent, hence increases the efficiency of the firm (see for example Schmutzler
(2001) and Klein and Rothfels (1999)). Ambec and Barla (2002) show that, by reducing
agency costs, an environmental regulation may enhance pollution-reducing innovation
while at the same time increasing firms’ private benefit.
Other specifications are e.g. Mohr (2002): he uses a general equilibrium framework
with a large number of agents, external economies of scale in production, and discrete
changes in technology. As new technologies are modelled with an industry learning
curve, firms are stuck in a non-innovating equilibrium, initially. Environmental regula-
tion enforces the adoption of ‘new technology’, hence allowing for subsequent learning.
However, learning is enforced by assumption rather than induced by economic incentives.
Related is Hu¨bner (2001). Using a duopoly model of a patent race, she shows that
stricter environmental policy might increase the probability of a sleeping patent instead
of encouraging environmental technological progress, but the reversed case is also possi-
ble: environmental policy may activate otherwise sleeping patents.
Our model differs in that it does not postulate any preference for the consumer of
green goods over non-green goods. Rather we focus on the aspect of (clean) technology
adoption, environmental regulation and taxation.
We will commence by using a pedagogic ‘basic model’ which emphasizes a crucial
point we want to make: environmental policy may destroy or shorten an non-adoption
equilibrium. It explains why it may be rational not to adopt, although no opportunities
are overlooked. In the second section we give a profit-maximizing version of the Porter
problem using a Hotelling framework. The third section concludes.
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1 Basic Idea: Environmental Policy Destroying Non-Adoption
Equilibria
In this first part of the section we will only consider a duopoly case on a national market.
Thus we assume away the effect of international competition and competitiveness to get
expositional clarity. In a further step we will then consider effects of an international
duopoly when firms face different national environmental regulation.
As in Tirole (1988, Chapter 10) we consider a process innovation that can be adopted
at some cost, C, which is constant over time. It is assumed that 1 < C < (1 + r)/r,
where r is the per-period rate of interest. If none of two firms adopts, the flow rent
for both is Π > 1. If only one firm adopts it gets Π + 1 and the other gets Π − 1.
Thus, the innovation merely transfers profits. If both firms adopt they both receive Π
again. The additional flow profit of adoption when the other firm has already adopted
is 1 > rC/(1 + r). The interest on the adoption cost or net present value of the rent of
adoption is (1 + r)/r > C. Therefore an adopting firm whose action can be observed
immediately will be followed by the other firm. This makes adoption for the first firm,
anticipating the second adoption, unprofitable. Because of the perfect observation and
reaction possibilities each firm can afford to wait and resist the temptation of adoption
profit, Π + 1, which will vanish immediately after the competitors adoption anyway. In
a pay-off bi-matrix the net present values of profits from adopting new or sticking to old
Table 1: Payoff with old and new technology
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 → New Old
New (1+r)Π
r
− C, (1+r)Π
r
− C (1+r)(Π+1)
r
− C, (1+r)(Π−1)
r
Old (1+r)(Π−1)
r
, (1+r)(Π+1)
r
− C (1+r)Π
r
, (1+r)Π
r
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Table 2: Payoff with environmental taxes
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 → New Old
New (1+r)Π
r
− C, (1+r)Π
r
− C (1+r)(Π+1)
r
− C, (1+r)(Π−1)
r
− T
Old (1+r)(Π−1)
r
− T, (1+r)(Π+1)
r
− C (1+r)Π
r
− T, (1+r)Π
r
− T
technologies are summarized in Table 1.
Adoption of both is also an equilibrium but one with worse results than no adoption
because adoption is costly. As both firms have the old technology in the beginning
and both can anticipate that adoption would be followed immediately by adoption of
the competitor, first adoption is self-damaging. No adoption for both is therefore the
superior equilibrium for the two firms (See Tirole 1988 and Fudenberg and Tirole 1987).
Given that the new technology is not only more cost efficient, but also cleaner by
assumption, the equilibrium is inferior from the consumers’ point of view. “New/New”
will only be an equilibrium if firms cannot observe competitors action and therefore
prefer to preempt. This case of imperfect information will, however, not be considered
here.
Next, suppose we have homogenous goods independent of the production technology.
However, the new technology produces the good without pollution while the old one is
dirty. The government punishes non-adoption with an environmental tax, T . Profits
and costs are unchanged otherwise. Then, the pay-off bi-matrix changes into the one
given in Table 2.
Clearly, if the environmental tax is high enough, it does not pay anymore for the two
firms to stay in the non-adoption equilibrium. Formally, if T > C, adoption becomes
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Table 3: International case with unilateral taxes
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 → New Old
New (1+r)Π
r
− C, (1+r)Π
r
− C (1+r)(Π+1)
r
− C, (1+r)(Π−1)
r
Old (1+r)(Π−1)
r
− T, (1+r)(Π+1)
r
− C (1+r)Π
r
− T, (1+r)Π
r
profitable even disregarding the action of the other duopolist. Both adopt the new, clean
technology. Without the tax, the technology would never have been adopted (see Table
1).
Proposition 1.1 Sufficiently high environmental taxes can force firms out of a non-
adoption equilibrium.
However, this argumentation so far falls short of the Porter Hypothesis in the original,
strong sense which (also) implies a competitive advantage for the nation that introduces
the environmental regulation. Let us assume free trade, so there is no tariff protection,
and that the home country, believing in the Porter Hypothesis introduces the environ-
mental tax or regulation at cost T . Firm 1 is located in ‘Home’, while firm 2 is located in
‘Foreign’, competing on a third market without transport costs or tariffs. Foreign does
not introduce any regulation, hence the pay-out matrix looks like Table 3.
We will now derive the conditions the tax has to fulfill, in order to be effective, and
also examine the effect of the tax in terms of the Porter Hypothesis. Firm 1 will adopt
the new technology if the net pay-off from adopting is higher than from non-adopting.
Let us examine separately the cases for a foreign firm 2 following adoption, and for a
foreign firm 2 that will not adopt. Let us assume for the moment that foreign firm 2
will not adopt at all, then the best strategy for firm 1 is to adopt if:
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(1 + r)(Π + 1)
r
− C > (1 + r)Π
r
− T
Subtracting Π(1+r)r on both sides yields
(1 + r)
r
> C − T
and after division by 1 + r:
C − T
1 + r
<
1
r
(1.1)
For C < (1 + r)/r, as assumed above, this holds for any T ≥ 0. This last condition
states that the discounted cost minus tax should be smaller than the discounted (infinite)
stream of future extra profits of the new technology (set to be equal to one in the Tirole
set-up used here). However, the equation above is derived under the condition that it is
not profitable for firm 2 to adopt — after all that is the case of competitive advantage
even if T = 0. Thus the following condition should also be fulfilled. The foreign firm 2
will not adopt as long as the costs of adoption are higher than regaining the ‘symmetric’
adoption equilibrium:
(1 + r)(Π− 1)
r
≥ (1 + r)Π
r
− C
Cancellation of the Π term yields:
C
1 + r
≥ 1
r
(1.2)
This contradicts the basic assumption that
1 + r
r
> C > 1.
Hence, firm 2 will follow immediately.
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Proposition 1.2 If only one country imposes an environmental tax, non-adoption is no
longer an equilibrium and both firms adopt the new technology immediately. The home
firm — in contrast to the Porter Hypothesis — has no advantage.
We will show below in a profit maximizing setting that this result is modified if
adoption is delayed because later adoption is cheaper.
2 An Application to the Hotelling model
The basic idea of the previous section can easily be carried out in the Hotelling frame-
work. Following Hotelling (1929) we model households who buy one unit of a good,
to be located on the unit interval [0,1] and firm 1, located at zero, has market share x
and firm 2, located at point 1 of the interval, has market share 1 − x.1 Household x
has transport cost xt if he buys from firm 1 and (1− x)t if he buys from firm 2. He is
indifferent between buying from any of the two firms if he has equal utility net of costs
from both. A firm that does innovate offers additional utility ∆s. Indicating adoption
by δ1,2 = 1 and non-adoption by δ1,2 = 0, equality of costs net of additional utility of
household x from buying from any of the two firms can be written as follows:
p1 − δ1∆s+ tx = p2 − δ2∆s+ t(1− x)
Solving for x and (1− x) respectively yields
x = [p2 − p1 + t− (δ2 − δ1)∆s]/2t and 1− x = [p1 − p2 + t+ (δ2 − δ1)∆s]/2t
Taxes, τ , for non-adoption appear in a lump-sum fashion in the flow of profits of the
firms where c denotes constant unit costs:
Πi = (pi − c) [pj−pi−(δj−δi)∆s+t]2t − (1− δi)τ − δi rC(1+r)
Obviously, taxes do not appear in the first-order conditions of profit maximization of
firms with respect to pi, and therefore they do not appear in the reaction functions.
1We do not model the entry and location decision of the two firms. While this can also be done, it
would be rather straightforward to rescale the outcome to reflect the unit interval of two established
firms as we describe it here.
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Table 4: Payoff matrix for Hotelling game: both firms taxed
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 −→ new old
new t/2− rC
1+r
, t/2− rC
1+r
(t+∆s/3)2
2t
− rC
(1+r)
, (t−∆s/3)
2
2t
− τ
old (t−∆s/3)
2
2t
− τ, (t+∆s/3)2
2t
− rC
(1+r)
t
2
− τ, t
2
− τ
Calculation of reaction functions, equilibrium prices and profits (see Tirole 1988, Chapter
7) yields flows of profits as summarized in Table 4.
Comparing this pay-off matrix for flow profits with that of section 2 for discounted
present values shows that the relation between flow and total taxes is T = (1 + r)τ/r.
If τ > rC(1 + r), it is clearly better for firms to adopt.
Proposition 2.1 Firms adopt in the Hotelling framework if the environmental tax τ is
sufficiently high, i.e. τ > rC(1 + r), which yields a higher profit than non-adoption.
2.1 Different forms of taxation
It may be interesting to note that other tax measures can easily fail to give an incentive
for adoption. An exemption from a specific consumption tax in case of adoption (δ1 = 1),
for example, leads to the following indifference condition for consumer x:
p1 + (1–δ1)τ − δ1∆s+ tx = p2 + (1− δ2)τ − δ2∆s+ t(1− x).
If both firms take the same decision, the tax term drops out in all following steps of the
analysis and therefore will have no impact on the diagonal elements of the pay-off matrix.
The tax exemption thus fails to provide an incentive for adoption. Next, consider an
exemption from a specific sales tax paid by producers. The indifference condition is
unaffected but profits are affected. The definition of profit becomes
Πi = [pi − (1− δi)τ − c][pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s+ t]
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Table 5: Payoff matrix for Hotelling game: sales tax paid by producers
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 −→ new old
new t/2, t/2 (t+(∆s+τ)/3)
2
2t
, (t−(∆s+τ)/3)
2
2t
old (t−(∆s+τ)/3)
2
2t
, (t+(∆s+τ)/3)
2
2t
t/2, t/2
Successive calculation of first-order conditions, reaction functions, equilibrium prices and
profits yields the flow of profits (gross of adoption costs) given in Table 5.
Proposition 2.2 Exemptions from consumer taxes fail to provide an incentive for adop-
tion. An exemption from specific sales taxes on producers has an impact only in the cases
of asymmetric adoption behaviour. However, asymmetric adoption behaviour is not an
equilibrium outcome.
Next, consider an ad valorem sales tax exemption for firms. Profits are redefined to
be
Πi = {pi[1 + (1− δi)τ ]− c}[pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s+ t]
First-order conditions can be written as
[1 + (1− δi)τ ][pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s+ t]− {pi[1 + (1− δi)τ ]− c} = 0
Dividing this equation by [1 + (1− δi)τ ] yields
[pj − pi − (δj − δi)∆s+ t]− {pi − c/[1 + (1− δi)τ ]} = 0
The production-cost term, c, did never appear in the pay-off matrix in all the cases
discussed so far. Therefore the tax term will also vanish with it in this case if (non)-
adoption behaviour is symmetric. This leads us to the following proposition:
Proposition 2.3 Exemption from ad-valorem producer taxes do not affect the non-
adoption equilibrium.
All of these examples from the Hotelling model confirm a well known lesson: a tax
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policy must approach the problem directly. The difference with other tax and tariff
lessons is that the incentive effect of x-best measures are in many other cases not zero
as they are here (Bhagwati and Srinivasan 1983). Proposing indirect taxation measures
for policy purposes then is tantamount to supporting the decision of the firms to avoid
adoption or to using a different model. Therefore the definition of environmental policies
which clarifies when a tax has to be paid is crucial. Attacking the problem directly will
work in every model
2.2 International case of differing taxation
Let us now consider the above mentioned case in which the two firms are located equidis-
tant from a national border.
Taxes, τ , for non-adoption appear again in a lump-sum fashion in the flow of profits of
the firms, however they are now indexed to indicate that they belong to country 1 or 2
respectively2:
Πi = (pi − c) [pj−pi−(δj−δi)∆s+t]2t − (1− δi)τi − δirC/(1 + r)
The only difference with the first model now is that τ has a country index which applies
also to the adoption tax. As taxes do not appear in the first-order conditions of profit
maximization of firms with respect to pi, and therefore they do not appear in the reaction
functions. Calculation of reaction functions, equilibrium prices and profits (see Tirole
1988, Chapter 7) yields flows of profits as summarized in Table 6.
If τ(1) < rC/(1+r < τ(2). Then , starting in a non-adoption situation for both firms,
firm 2 now has an incentive to adopt, whereas firm 1 does not. In this situation firm
1 would loose also some market share. Therefore firm 1 will compare profits under the
assumption that firm 2 adopts. The comparison yields that firm 1 will adopt if
t
2
− rC
1 + r
>
(t−∆s/3)2
2t
− τ1
2Negative τ can be interpreted as a subsidy. Therefore the same calculations and argumentation could
be applied to subsidies.
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or
t
2
− (t−∆s/3)
2
2t
>
rC
1 + r
− τ1 > 0
If differences in gross profits are larger than differences in adoption cost, firm 1 will
follow and the Porter hypothesis does not hold, because the firm with the more environ-
mentally friendly government has no advantage. If the condition does not hold, firm 1
does not adopt and firm 2 has an advantage because of an increase in gross profits under
no additional conditions:
(t+∆s/3)2
2t
− rC
1 + r
>
t
2
− τ2
holds if
(t+∆s/3)2
2t
− t
2
>
rC
1 + r
− τ2
This holds as
(t+∆s/3)2
2t
− t
2
=
(∆s/3)2 + 2t∆s/3
2t
> 0 >
rC
1 + r
− τ2
Proposition 2.4 If two countries have different taxes on non-adoption, such that they
are higher than adoption costs in one of them and lower in the other, the Porter hypoth-
esis holds if the avoidance of loss in market share and profits through second adoption is
insufficient to outweigh the adoption costs net of the taxes avoided.
However, this result hinges on several assumptions. First of all, we have assumed
that consumers themselves do not have any preferences for the goods that are produced
using the cleaner technology. In that respect we have eliminated one of the main aspects
in which the Hotelling model allows to diminish the (price) competition, namely the
differentiation of goods.3 However, the transport costs have the same effect.
3Eriksson (2004) has shown this to yield some results for the clean technology. He does not relate his
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Table 6: Payoff matrix for international Hotelling game: both firms taxed
Firm 1 ↓ \ Firm 2 −→ new old
new t/2− rC
1+r
, t/2− rC
1+r
(t+∆s/3)2
2t
− rC
(1+r)
, (t−∆s/3)
2
2t
− τ2
old (t−∆s/3)
2
2t
− τ1, (t+∆s/3)
2
2t
− rC
(1+r)
t
2
− τ1, t2 − τ2
On the other hand we have not focussed on location competition after the environ-
mental regulation takes place. Quite often polluting firms locate ‘across the border’ if
markets in the border region are to be served. However, for existing firms the reloca-
tion of production brings significant adjustment costs which would warrant to question
immediate reactions of already existing firms.
3 Conclusion
Given the prominent role of innovation offsets in the Porter Hypothesis we did prefer to
model it using a framework of technology adoption by Fudenberg and Tirole in which
non-adoption is an equilibrium outcome although firms are profit maximizing.
In the static version of the model we did show that a non-adoption equilibrium can be
destroyed by an environmental non-adoption tax. However, as the foreign firm follows
there is, in contrast to the Porter Hypothesis, no advantage for the home firm .
This result also holds in the Hotelling version of the static model. Moreover, we show
that taxes not directly targeting the non-adoption problem may fail to have an adoption
incentive on the firms.
model to technology adoption or the Porter Hypothesis. His model has the crucial assumption that
the population of consumers is heterogenous with respect to their preferences of clean production.
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